Research note. Every number below is an upper bound on one named event, proved from a finite-field theorem by a 22-adic descent. None is a matching attack, a measured floor, or the security level of a protocol. The panels build intuition; the manuscript carries the proofs.1

Summary

Things being what they are, the processors of the world count modulo 2k2^k. Proof systems that want to speak that arithmetic natively lift it into a Galois ring R=GR(2k,m)R=\mathrm{GR}(2^k,m): a finite local ring with residue field F2m\mathbb F_{2^m}, containing Z2k\mathbb Z_{2^k} when m=1m=1 and the binary field when k=1k=1. The Reed–Solomon pipeline that fields enjoy carries over almost intact.2 Almost. One number resists: how many bad challenges a batched proximity test can tolerate before it stops binding.

Over a field that number is linear in the block length. Over the ring, the published analysis said quadratic. The difference is not a constant; it is a power of ℓ\ell.

This note proves the linear threshold over the ring, at every radius below unique decoding, with no factor of kk and no extra term in sδℓs\delta\ell. At the ring parameters used in the Ring0 stack, (s,ℓ,m)=(64,221,155)(s,\ell,m)=(64,2^{21},155), the quadratic expression yields 2−1072^{-107}, the curve bound proved here yields 2−1282^{-128}, and an affine variant yields 2−1342^{-134}. Twenty-one bits, then six more.

Interactive · Bad-challenge probability

Three bounds, one geometry.

Upper bounds on the probability that a fresh uniform Teichmüller challenge is bad when the words lack common agreement. Defaults are the parameters used in the manuscript.

64
2^21
𝔽₂^155
  • Published bounds·ℓ² / 2ᵐ
    2-107
  • This work, curves·ℓ / 2ᵐ
    2-128
  • This work, affineℓ / 2ᵐ
    2-134

Curve gains 21 bits over the published expression; affine gains a further 6. Bars are proportional to the security exponent, longer is smaller probability.

1. What a proximity gap promises

Fix s+1s+1 words g0,…,gs∈REg_0,\dots,g_s\in R^E over an evaluation domain EE of size ℓ\ell. Batch them into one curve, driven by one random challenge:

w(α)=∑j=0sαjgj.w(\alpha)=\sum_{j=0}^{s}\alpha^{j}g_j .

Ask whether w(α)w(\alpha) lies within δℓ\delta\ell of the Reed–Solomon code RS[R,E,ρ]\mathrm{RS}[R,E,\rho], the evaluations of polynomials of degree below ρℓ\rho\ell. A proximity gap with correlated agreement answers with a threshold LL: if more than LL challenges pass, then every component agrees with a codeword, and they all agree on the same coordinate set, of size at least (1−δ)ℓ(1-\delta)\ell. Not each on its own set. One set.

The threshold is the entire economy of the test. A fresh uniform challenge from a set of size qq is bad with probability at most L/qL/q, and a folding protocol pays that price every round. Halve LL and you gain a bit. Divide it by ℓ\ell and you gain twenty.

SettingObjectChallenge setRadiusThreshold LL
Finite field (BCIKS)3curve ∑αjgj\sum\alpha^j g_jFq\mathbb F_qunique decodingsℓs\ell
Galois ring (Wu et al.)4line g0+αg1g_0+\alpha g_1full ringJohnsonO(1)O(1) in ℓ\ell; vacuous on T\mathcal T
Galois ring (JLXYY, CRYPTO 2025)5curve ∑αjgj\sum\alpha^j g_jT\mathcal Tunique decodingsℓ2s\ell^2
This workcurve ∑αjgj\sum\alpha^j g_jT\mathcal Tunique decodingsℓs\ell
This work, affineg0+∑zjgjg_0+\sum z_j g_jTs\mathcal T^sunique decodingℓqs−1\ell q^{s-1}

Here T⊂R\mathcal T\subset R is the Teichmüller set, the 2m2^m roots of X2m−XX^{2^m}-X in RR. Reduction modulo 22 maps it onto F2m\mathbb F_{2^m} one to one, and any two of its elements differ by a unit.6 Challenges are drawn from T\mathcal T. The evaluation domain needs only the second property.

The field had its linear gap. The ring was owed one.

2. Why rings are harder than fields

In a field, every nonzero element divides. Cancel a common factor and nothing is lost. In GR(2k,m)\mathrm{GR}(2^k,m) with k≥2k\ge2, the element 22 is nilpotent, a zero-divisor, and cancelling it is not a step at all. It is a mistake.

The smallest ring already shows it. In Z/4Z\mathbb Z/4\mathbb Z, 2⋅1=2⋅32\cdot1=2\cdot3, and 1≠31\ne3. What survives is weaker, narrower, and exact: multiplication by 22 is injective as a map between consecutive quotient rings,

R/2k−t−1R  ↪  R/2k−tR,R/2^{k-t-1}R\;\hookrightarrow\;R/2^{k-t}R ,

because the annihilator of 2t2^t is precisely 2k−tR2^{k-t}R. So 2a=2b2a=2b in R/2kRR/2^kR says nothing about a=ba=b. It says a≡ba\equiv b one ring lower. The descent below performs no other division.

Interactive · Why you cannot cancel 2

Multiplication by 2 in ℤ/8ℤ

Pick a and see every b with 2b = 2a. Cancelling 2 in the ring is illegal; reading the result one ring lower is exact.

ℤ/8ℤ
1
  1. 02·0 = 0
  2. 12·1 = 2
  3. 22·2 = 4
  4. 32·3 = 6
  5. 42·4 = 0
  6. 52·5 = 2
  7. 62·6 = 4
  8. 72·7 = 6
Solutions of 2b = 2a
1, 5 — 2 elements, so 2a = 2b does not give a = b.
Read one ring lower
Both solutions equal 1 in ℤ/4ℤ. Multiplication by 2 is injective as a map ℤ/4ℤ ↪ ℤ/8ℤ; that is the only division the descent performs.

The prior ring proof took the field toolkit, Berlekamp–Welch decoding and the Polishchuk–Spielman lemma, and generalised it to the ring. Its displayed sufficient condition has the shape

e+ρℓ−1ℓ−e+s(e+1)∣S∣−se<1,\frac{e+\rho\ell-1}{\ell-e}+\frac{s(e+1)}{|S|-se}<1 ,

with e=⌊δℓ⌋e=\lfloor\delta\ell\rfloor. At the unique-decoding boundary the first term is 1−Θ(1/ℓ)1-\Theta(1/\ell). The slack is of order 1/ℓ1/\ell; to fit inside it, the second term needs a challenge count of order sℓ2s\ell^2. That is where the square enters. It is a property of that inequality, not a floor on the error, and the argument below does not depend on repairing it.5

Where the field cancels, the ring divides once, and only downward.

3. The 22-adic descent

The method is one refusal: do no ring algebra where field algebra suffices. Reduce modulo 22. Apply the field theorem. Lift the answer, subtract it, divide the residual by 22. What remains is the same problem, one ring shorter. Repeat kk times.

At layer ll the words gj(l)g_j^{(l)} live over Rk−l=R/2k−lRR_{k-l}=R/2^{k-l}R on a domain Al−1⊆EA_{l-1}\subseteq E.

  1. Project. Reduce modulo 22. Every good ring challenge becomes a good field challenge, and distinct Teichmüller challenges stay distinct.
  2. Agree. The field theorem returns codewords Cˉj(l)\bar C_j^{(l)} and a common discrepancy support WlW_l: the coordinates where some gˉj(l)\bar g_j^{(l)} still disagrees.
  3. Lift. Choose any lift of the <ρℓ<\rho\ell coefficients of Cˉj(l)\bar C_j^{(l)} to Rk−lR_{k-l}, fixed before any challenge is examined.
  4. Carry. Off WlW_l, the difference gj(l)−Cj(l)g_j^{(l)}-C_j^{(l)} is divisible by 22. Divide it. The quotient gj(l+1)g_j^{(l+1)} is a word over Rk−l−1R_{k-l-1} on Al=Al−1∖WlA_l=A_{l-1}\setminus W_l.

At the last layer the ring is already the field. Find its agreement set and stop. Unrolling the digit relation gj(l)=Cj(l)+2gj(l+1)g_j^{(l)}=C_j^{(l)}+2g_j^{(l+1)} across every layer reconstitutes one ring codeword,

Cj=∑l=0k−12lCj(l),C_j=\sum_{l=0}^{k-1}2^{l}C_j^{(l)} ,

which agrees with gjg_j on the final domain. The lifts are not unique. The codeword is: any two candidates lie within ee of gjg_j, agree on more than ρℓ\rho\ell exceptional points, and therefore coincide.

One fact holds the carry together. The residual cα(l)−∑jαjCj(l)c_\alpha^{(l)}-\sum_j\alpha^jC_j^{(l)}, between the decoded codeword and the lifted combination, must itself be divisible by 22 as a polynomial. It is, because both terms reduce to field codewords of degree below ρℓ\rho\ell within ele_l of the same word, and at unique decoding the list has one entry. The proof uses that reduction is a ring homomorphism, and nothing else.

Reduce, agree, lift, carry. Then again, one ring down.

4. Where the factor kk would have come from

Done carelessly, the descent costs a factor of kk and a third of the radius. Let each layer spend the full budget e=⌊δℓ⌋e=\lfloor\delta\ell\rfloor on new discrepancies. The punctured domain at layer ll has length ℓ−bl\ell-b_l, and the instance must still sit inside unique decoding of the punctured code. That demands 2e+bl≤(1−ρ)ℓ2e+b_l\le(1-\rho)\ell, and as blb_l climbs toward ee it forces δ≤(1−ρ)/3\delta\le(1-\rho)/3. The radius is gone before the last layer.

Three lemmas prevent it.

Budget reduction. Count only the new discrepancies WlW_l carved at layer ll, and lower the budget by exactly that: el+1=el−∣Wl∣e_{l+1}=e_l-|W_l|. The radius condition becomes 2e<(1−ρ)ℓ+bl2e<(1-\rho)\ell+b_l. It holds at layer zero, and it gains slack at every layer after. The full radius (1−ρ)/2(1-\rho)/2 survives to the end.

Cancellation challenges. A challenge can cancel at a discrepancy x∈Wlx\in W_l: the curve's component errors may sum to zero there and hide it. For fixed xx, that condition is a nonzero polynomial of degree at most ss over F2m\mathbb F_{2^m}. At most ss roots per point; at most s∣Wl∣s|W_l| challenges per layer. Discard them.

A threshold that shrinks with the domain. The field theorem on a domain of length ℓ−bl\ell-b_l asks for more than s(ℓ−bl)s(\ell-b_l) challenges. Start above sℓs\ell, discard at most sblsb_l, and precisely that many remain. Each carved coordinate lowers the demand by the same amount the cancellations cost.

Both totals telescope, and neither carries kk:

∑l=0k−1∣Wl∣≤δℓ,∑l=0k−1s∣Wl∣≤sδℓ.\sum_{l=0}^{k-1}|W_l|\le\delta\ell, \qquad \sum_{l=0}^{k-1}s|W_l|\le s\delta\ell .

Interactive · Layer accounting

Walk the descent, layer by layer.

Batch width fixed at s = 4. Each layer carves a random slice of the total budget e = ⌊δℓ⌋. Toggle the accounting to see why the naive version loses the radius.

GR(2^4, m)
2^8
0.50
0.220 < 0.250
  1. Layer 0 · R/2^4inside unique decoding
    Domain ℓ−bₗ
    256
    Budget eₗ
    56
    Carved |Wₗ|
    22
    Field threshold
    1024
    Challenges left
    1025
    Discarded ≤ s|Wₗ|
    88
  2. Layer 1 · R/2^3inside unique decoding
    Domain ℓ−bₗ
    234
    Budget eₗ
    34
    Carved |Wₗ|
    15
    Field threshold
    936
    Challenges left
    937
    Discarded ≤ s|Wₗ|
    60
  3. Layer 2 · R/2^2inside unique decoding
    Domain ℓ−bₗ
    219
    Budget eₗ
    19
    Carved |Wₗ|
    15
    Field threshold
    876
    Challenges left
    877
    Discarded ≤ s|Wₗ|
    60
  4. Layer 3 · 𝔽inside unique decoding
    Domain ℓ−bₗ
    204
    Budget eₗ
    4
    Carved |Wₗ|
    4
    Field threshold
    816
    Challenges left
    817
    Discarded ≤ s|Wₗ|
    0
Telescoped totals
Σ|Wₗ| = 56 ≤ e = 56; discarded challenges Σ s|Wₗ| = 208 ≤ s·e = 224. Neither carries a factor of k.
Final agreement set
|A| = 200 ≥ ℓ − e = 200. Challenges stay above the shrinking field threshold at every layer because s·ℓ − s·bₗ = s(ℓ − bₗ).
Radius
Tight accounting needs 2e < (1−ρ)ℓ + bₗ, which only gains slack as bₗ grows. Every layer stays at the full radius (1−ρ)/2 = 0.250.

The layers do not each pay. They share one budget, and the budget is δℓ\delta\ell.

5. Removing the factor ss

The curve threshold carries ss because a single challenge must absorb the whole batch. Combine the same words as an affine space instead, with ss independent challenges z∈Tsz\in\mathcal T^s:

w(z)=g0+∑j=1szj gj.w(z)=g_0+\sum_{j=1}^{s}z_j\,g_j .

Now the cancellation condition at a point is an affine equation in zˉ∈Fs\bar z\in\mathbb F^s, a hyperplane, with exactly qs−1q^{s-1} solutions. The other two lemmas never inspect the coefficients, so the descent runs unchanged. The threshold is ℓqs−1\ell q^{s-1} out of qsq^s vectors, and the bad-challenge probability is ℓ/2m\ell/2^m: independent of the batch width.

The price is ss draws instead of one. Whether the transcript can afford them is the protocol's question. The bound does not answer it.

6. What the bound does and does not cover

Uniform residue suffices. The count sees only residues. Any challenge whose reduction modulo 22 is uniform in F2m\mathbb F_{2^m} receives the same bound, full-ring draws included; the higher digits may be distributed however one likes. The words must be fixed before the challenge is drawn.

Weights carry through. A weighted form tracks rational coordinate weights of denominator MM through the same descent. Composing rr layers with weights Mi=2iM_i=2^i on lengths ℓ/2i\ell/2^i costs a factor rr in the summed bound. A maximum of local transition bounds and a sum of failure probabilities are two different numbers, and a compiler must say which one it needs.

A protocol still owes its own reductions. The theorem bounds one event for fixed component words. A folding protocol must separately prove that a far parent yields components without common agreement for the child code and radius, that its fold identity holds, and that its terminal test, its authentication, and its extractor behave. Only then does the per-round count

Pr⁡[Δ(Foldαf,Ci+1)≤δℓi+1]≤s ℓi+12m\Pr\bigl[\Delta(\mathrm{Fold}_\alpha f,C_{i+1})\le\delta\ell_{i+1}\bigr]\le\frac{s\,\ell_{i+1}}{2^m}

follow, with ℓi+1/2m\ell_{i+1}/2^m for the affine adapter.

Past unique decoding is open. Extending common agreement beyond (1−ρ)/2(1-\rho)/2 over Galois rings needs a different argument. This descent does not supply it.

A bound is a promise about one event. The protocol must keep the rest.

What was proved

A linear threshold sℓs\ell for the batched curve over GR(2k,m)\mathrm{GR}(2^k,m), at every δ<(1−ρ)/2\delta<(1-\rho)/2, independent of kk, with proximity loss zero. An affine variant with threshold ℓqs−1\ell q^{s-1}, which removes the batch width from the probability. Weighted and uniform-residue forms of both. The only external input is the finite-field theorem; the only divisions are by units, or through the injection between consecutive quotient rings.

At unique decoding the ring costs nothing. The accounting was the whole difficulty.

References

Footnotes

  1. Luis Ángel González. A Linear Proximity Gap for Batched Reed–Solomon Codes over Galois Rings. Zenodo, 23 June 2026. Local copy: PDF. Full statements, proofs, the weighted section, and deferred lemmas. ↩

  2. H. Zeilberger, B. Chen, B. Fisch. BaseFold: efficient field-agnostic polynomial commitment schemes from foldable codes. CRYPTO 2024. ↩

  3. E. Ben-Sasson, D. Carmon, Y. Ishai, S. Kopparty, S. Saraf. Proximity gaps for Reed–Solomon codes. J. ACM 70(5), 2023. The finite-field base case, Theorems 1.5, 1.6 and 6.1. ↩

  4. Z. Wu, X. Zhang, Y. Deng, Y. Wei, Z. Zhang, L. Yang. Polylogarithmic polynomial commitment scheme over Galois rings. 2025. A single-line gap with full-ring challenges at the Johnson radius. ↩

  5. Y. Jia, S. Li, C. Xing, Y. Yao, C. Yuan. Polynomial commitments for Galois rings and applications to SNARKs over Z2k\mathbb Z_{2^k}. CRYPTO 2025. The quadratic threshold sharpened here. ↩ ↩2

  6. Z.-X. Wan. Lectures on Finite Fields and Galois Rings. World Scientific, 2003. Teichmüller sets and the chain-ring structure. ↩